and Brigid Inder; stateswomen like Mary Robinson and Hillary Clinton; and still another woman whose lifework has inspired my own, Martha Minow.
I am humbled, finally, to accept this award not only on my behalf, but also on behalf of my three co-editors, Kate Doty, Jaya Ramji-Nogales, and Beth Van Schaack, and, indeed, on behalf of the more than 300 women (plus a few men) who have contributed to IntLawGrrls.
2 Those of you who are with us here today, please stand. Thank you. This award belongs to every one of you.
(You know, I never had a sister, and my mother has been gone for more than a decade now.
But I would like to give shout-out to the men in my life: my husband, Peter O'Neill, and our son,
Tiernan O'Neill. Tiernan is in school today, so they had to stay at home, but they are here today in my heart.)
Even though we are all winners, our general dislike for cacophony demands that only one of us speak today. That honor falls to me, and given that this is a lunch talk, I have chosen a light and modest topic. Well, no, I'm afraid I have not. My title is, in fact, "International Law and the Future of Peace." For this audience, it might more fittingly be called "Peace: A Feminist Project." 3 As many of you know, IntLawGrrls often dedicated their contributions to transnational foremothers. 4 Consistent with the assumption that we women are more nurturing than, shall we say, other humans, 5 contributors frequently chose to honor pacifist heroines. simultaneously enabling exploitation. 14 In short, there is a line to be drawn, and in our world, the task of drawing that line often falls to the shapers of international law.
We all know in broad outline the rules that govern the use of force. They appear in the foundational text of modern international law, the Charter of the United Nations. From 1945 onwards, U.N. member states promised to "settle their disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered," and further to "refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state ...." 15 States reserved an "inherent right" of self-defense, but only "if an armed attack occurs ..., until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security." 16 We know too that at Nuremberg and in Tokyo, convicted leaders were hanged for committing aggressive war -called crimes against peace -and for the atrocities that ensued. 17 Taken together, these developments signaled that no state would be permitted to launch an offensive attack, that none therefore would need to exercise self-defense, and that leaders who acted in violation would be punished. That legal framework ought to have put an end to war, or at least to war between states. It did not.
The next six decades saw a number of international armed conflicts, as well as many conflicts dubbed "not of an international character" even though outside countries were aiding one 14 Using the term "associative policies" to refer to interstate efforts at cooperation, Galtung wrote: Clearly the problem is to bring parties together to prevent direct violence without at the same time creating structural violence. This is the general problem of peace politics in our time: how to practice associative policies as a bulwark against direct violence without at the same time getting into the pitfalls of structural violence. prosecutors at Nuremberg argued that aggression "had become a customary, uncodified war crime by virtue of a progressive chain of events," dating to the post-World War I era and including "the adoption of the Kellogg-Briand treaty outlawing war"). side or another. Examples are the Iran-Iraq War and the struggle in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, each of which claimed a million or more lives. 18 In the face of such conflicts, the Security
Council often failed to shoulder its responsibility to maintain peace; that is, it failed both to stop attacks and to bring attackers to account. 19 From these failures emerged new doctrines, by which states sought to justify acting outside the confines of the Council. The timing requirement for self-defense was said to permit reaction not only after, or in immediate anticipation of, an armed attack, but also well before a presumed attack is imminent. 20 States were said to be free to use force so long as such use would not be "inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations"; 21 for example, in order to rescue their own nationals. 22 Also said to serve U.N. purposes was the resort to force in defense of others, commonly known, of course, as humanitarian intervention. 23 And what of the crime against peace that was prosecuted in the Nuremberg era? Concern was expressed; it was said that authorizing the ICC to punish this offense of aggression might have a chilling effect on interventions undertaken in the name of rescuing humanity. 24 Among those giving voice to this concern was my dear colleague, Professor Van Schaack. While putting it forward in a 2010 article, however, she acknowledged that privileging this concern has consequences. To deny international mechanisms the power to question war-making decisions is, in effect, to give leaders the right to choose whether to intervene. Accepting that result "requires,"
she wrote, "coming to terms with a certain valorization of militarism."
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Her words serve to underscore one feature of these emergent doctrines: they condone violence; that is, they justify meeting violence with violence. In my view, this too is cause for concern. Suffering and death, even atrocities, are the inevitable spawn even of just wars. s a matter of international law, the United States is in an armed conflict with al-Qa'ida, the Taliban, and associated forces, in response to the 9/11 attacks, and we may also use force consistent with our inherent right of national self-defense," and furthermore that " [t] here is nothing in international law that bans the use of remotely piloted aircraft for this purpose or that prohibits us from using lethal force against our enemies outside of an active battlefield, at least when the country involved consents or is unable or unwilling to take action against the threat"), available at http://www.cfr.org/counterterrorism/brennans-speech-counterterrorism-april-2012/p28100; Harold Hongju Koh, The Obama Administration and International Law (Mar. 25, 2010) (asserting, in an ASIL annual to peace; this is evident in writings that consider the concept of responsibility to protect almost solely within the context of military intervention. 29 In similar vein, the easy justification of force invites states to abandon too hastily the difficult pursuit of pacific dispute settlement. The example that jumps to mind is the 2003 decision to dispense with diplomacy and invade Iraq. Invasion led not to the promised discovery of enemy weapons of mass destruction, but rather to the deaths of nearly 5,000 service members and more than 100,000 civilians, to the displacement of well over a million persons, and to costs in the trillions of dollars.
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Our pacifist heroine, Jane Addams, would have had none of this. In 1915, a year into the conflict on the Continent, Addams bemoaned that "because of war, the finest consciences in
Europe are put to the old business of self-justification, of utilizing outgrown myths to explain the course of action which their governments have taken." 31 38 I choose to write of human "security," rather than "rights," for the reason that rights too often are realized only after they are violated, and even then only by the few victims who possess resources to seek redress. I have written elsewhere:
[W]hereas 'human rights' activists often look to judges for vindication, in the form of post hoc compensation for individual deprivations of rights, 'human security' is not so limited. Security may be secured without resort to the courts -indeed, I would argue that it is best secured when it is embedded in the structure of the system, so that insecurity never occurs. In this sense the actors most responsible for human security are the legislators who establish the protective/preventive structure and the executive officers who implement that structure. Judges are not the first guarantors of and within the state. In short, this demand subverts structural violence as well as direct violence, and so serves the fullest understanding of peace. 
